Impermanence of Deterrence Regime: A Cause of Tactical Instability in South Asia
Keywords:
Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Stability, Tactical Instability, BalakotAbstract
The overt nuclearisation of South Asia led to the notion that an all-out conventional war between India and Pakistan was a distant probability, whereas, limited wars on the periphery may not be avoidable between the arch-rivals. Perhaps, to further marginalise the probability of limited wars, which could have serious consequences for regional peace and stability, Pakistan developed sub-kiloton Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs). However, India could not be deterred and Balakot happened. Pakistan’s response was prompt and fearless despite India’s military capabilities. The Pakistan Air Force’s performance in the aerial engagement against the Indian Air Force (IAF) on 27 February 2019, deflated India’s dream of punishing Pakistan for its alleged support of the freedom struggle in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). This paper is aimed at investigating the failures of deterrence regime at the tactical level between India and Pakistan, and the consequences of tactical instability at the strategic level in South Asia.
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Copyright (c) 2022 Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS) Islamabad
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
© 2025 Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS) Islamabad. This work is published by the Journal of Aerospace & Security Studies (JASS) and licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0). This license allows unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are properly credited.
